started as "Occupy Wall Street," a New York based movement, quickly spread around the globe. Slogans have appeared not only to occupy this or that street, but also cities, buildings, workplaces, and so on.
Rebel Cities is a very timely book. In this work Harvey tries not only to provide a theoretical backbone for explaining the relationships between the logic of capital, urbanization, and the appropriation of common resources (both tangible and in-), but also to think through and constructively critique the alternatives that are being proposed mostly from the political left (but not exclusively), indicating both their potentialities and limitations. Above all, Harvey insists on a simple yet powerful demand, one which underlies his book, namely: for the common right(s) of all to shape the city according to individual and common desires and not according to the 1%-the joint clique of bankers, developers, financiers and the very wealthy. Rebel Cities does not engage in an extensive analysis of capital, nor is it a purely polemical reading. Rather, it draws upon the major critical ideas of capitalism that have stood the test of time and that date back to the tradition of Karl Marx's critique of political economy. Harvey's book updates these ideas within the context of the contemporary city, social movements, and the general situation of capitalism today.
The implicit, ironic, insightful question that Harvey poses throughout the book is the following: if a city is produced and reproduced by its citizens/workers/(re)producers, why does both the economic and symbolic-cultural value and surplus value produced get continuously appropriated and controlled by a handful private interests? For the context of this question, we must bear in mind that Harvey reconceptualizes and updates the figure of the worker from the ISSN 2029-0454 VOLUME 5, NUMBER 2 2012
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classical Marxist proletariat to include the non-material workforce, such as precarious workers and the increasingly significant sector of domestic workers responsible for the reproduction of city's social fabric. Harvey's key question begs an answer on two levels: first, what are the structural qualities of the system that allow and/or engender this; and secondly-the normative one-do I (and whatever "we" there is) want this kind of distribution of wealth (understood in a broad sense)
and are we satisfied with the current arrangement?
Harvey's book provides a highly compelling and largely satisfying set of answers to these questions, supported by a great deal of empirical evidence. In the process of giving his answers, he equally updates and revitalizes Karl Marx's classical critique of political-economy, though not without his own particular twists, especially given his background as a geographer.
Harvey is convincing when he proposes that a stronger emphasis be put on secondary forms of exploitation-by merchant and land capital-than on the primary, production based form, which receives greater emphasis in Marx's critique of capital. Harvey is also correct to stress Marx's own point that: for capital what matters is the whole cycle of circulation, and therefore it is not of importance for capital whether the value will be re-appropriated at the workplace or after work in Rebel Cities provides excellent reasons for why, at the contemporary junction of capitalism's developments and crises, this signifier would be most suitable.
Although this book could be branded a leftist tract, the idea of the city dweller and citizen that Harvey proposes in the end blurs the artificial left/right political boundaries. Rebel Cities is an important book for any city dweller interested and invested in the ability and capacity to change one's own common environment and to reinvent the city more after our own heart's desire.
Reviewed by Edvardas Giedraitis. Bates digs deep into political unity and its nature, especially in the context of an existential crisis when unity must be defended despite any source of it being questioned. It is the political that appears in such a situation as the defense of unity. Moments of crises particularly amplify the tension between constitutionalism and law on the one hand and the existential power of political authority on the other. Also, in such moments of crisis it becomes especially evident that legal norms are not there to enforce themselves and need to be imposed upon a political community from outside and yet at the same time from inside of the political community. In short, it is the function of the sovereign authority to constitute order. This was true of Weimar Germany but this is also true of the early twentyfirst century. And it was also the case during the Enlightenment. In addition to this, Bates, the discovery of Enlightenment thinkers and not an object of their criticism.
As a matter of fact, the political and the legal limitations of state violence were developed coextensively and in direct relationship with one another, and this relationship is still important today because, despite the postulations of sovereignty's decline, the state is still the field where power and law clash directly.
The complexity of the matter lies in the paradoxical position and nature of the political. On the one hand, the political has to be autonomous in order for specifically political criteria describing a community to exist -and only then an understanding of political legitimacy (both of a particular act and of a state as such)
is possible. On the other hand, the autonomous political can also mean power that has no limit external to itself. Thus any political community constantly oscillates between the pressing need to restrain and limit political power and yet to thrust into the open the field of purely political contestation which is the only means to preserve the grouping in times of crises when rational and legal legitimations fail.
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For Bates, just as legal order must at the same time be based on the pre-existing political unity of a people and lay the foundations of and criteria for the very existence of the same people, the autonomous concept of the political is at the same time a potential savior and a potential destroyer of communal order.
However, if the political is an ineradicable, albeit potentially dangerous, part of the process of creating and maintaining the state, it can at least be accommodated. In
Bates' interpretation, the political is an existential category without any content and thus exists only as a potentiality but never as justified by particular human conflicts or, conversely, as a means of justifying them by itself. Of course, Schmitt himself did not impute any specific content into the concept of the political. In fact, for him any stake could reach the political status if only it acquired an existential intensity.
However, the potential for ultimate conflict and violence (civil war) was always a real possibility for Schmitt. It is in order to ground the divergence from the original concept that Bates' genealogy of the political comes into play.
As Bates reads it, there was no concept of the political (and there could not even be one) in the writings of natural-law theorists, such as Grotius and Hobbes, due to their emphasis on the rational autonomy of the natural individual. Indeed, an autonomous rational actor cannot give birth to a specifically political principle because it lacks the social dimension needed for intense relationships to develop. It was only with Pufendorf that an independent logic of social organization was hinted at, but then again subordinated to state institutions, the purpose of which was to protect the rational autonomy of individuals and to ensure social order. Therefore, the political had not yet acquired autonomy. It is with Locke that Bates sees the first isolation of the political-as the decisive principle of defending one's community from external threats. For Locke, the original integrity of human communities was fractured by the emergence of property and the advent of capitalist accumulation because it creates new conflicts within the community and destroys trust and legitimacy through corruption. Therefore, the challenge is to recreate political unity when fragmentation, distrust and hostility prevail. A remedy is found in law, commitments, and principles and thus the autonomy of the political is still diminished. A fundamental shift in conceptualizing the autonomous political, as Bates sees it, takes place with Montesquieu only.
In Montesquieu one finds a threat of war-both interstate and civil-that not only challenges the community but also elevates it to a new level by creating a political community-a body that has a sovereign power capable of defending the community as such (and not just one part of it or a single interest). This is not to say that the grouping has a clear political consciousness as a unity but only that it is refounded as a unity in the face of an imminent dissolution. Therefore, one important. Another result of the political emanating directly from the individual is that political unity is no longer exclusionary at its core-no longer a fictional homogeneity but rather an absolute consensus of free individuals for the sake of self-preservation. It is only for this end that a coordinated whole of the society is created. Bates sees two fundamental consequences here: first, the membership of the political community is potentially unlimited (and the political can transcend the state), thus countering Schmitt's claim that 'humanity' is not a political body; second, the political becomes a remedy from power relations and not an embodiment of them. These arguments are vital to Bates' subsequent exploration of the modern relevance of the (primarily Rousseauldian) political, especially when interpreted in line with another of Rousseau's concepts, that of the general will.
Rousseau's general will, for Bates, is the singular logic that drives all the parts of the political body. However, the singular nature of this will needs more elaboration. This is not exactly the unity of content, which would eradicate or subsume any difference. It is singular in a sense that it is concerned solely with the survival of the political body and is aided in this by the legal and governmental institutions that serve as channels for conveying information and will. Therefore, despite the singularity of the general will, the social contract a la Rousseau is seen not only as non-essentialist but also as precluding any identity whatsoever. As a result, arguing directly against Schmitt, enmity cannot be the origin of the political because there are no pre-existing communities to be politicized. The political per se is no longer a social category but absolutely mimetic to the existential demands of the individual. As a result, it is freedom-of both the individuals and the body that they comprise-that characterizes a political society, which is radically open and not limited to any particularity. Thus, as already mentioned, the political community is infinitely extendable and knows no necessary outside, the only requirement being that those who wish to join commit to the general will. In this way Bates hopes to have overcome the tension between the autonomous logic of the political and universal human rights as well as the globalized international community. However, in reality he leaves crucial questions unanswered.
There are at least three major problems that Bates does not address. First of all, his quasi-Rousseauldian contract is spurred by an existential threat that urges individuals to enter into an organized political community under conditions set out in a social contract. However, if that community is potentially global, it is no longer possible to see a threat that would motivate the individuals to uphold a community because there would no longer be an outside (and thus a threat Bates misses the double functioning of Montesquieu's constitution, which makes it the epicenter of political contestation. But also the empty general will a la Rousseau is problematic. To say that it is filled by particular individual wills channeled by political institutions and any outcome is always already agreed upon is to pass appearance for reality. Indeed, for a political system to function, its actions have to be passed as the will of all. But the question of who decides (a core Schmittian question) still remains unanswered. As a result, the general will is an object of contestation but hardly ever on an individual level as Bates would like to have it.
And yet, credit has to be paid to Bates' work. First of all, it is due to the innovative approach applied to both the Schmittian political and Enlightenment thought. Bates is absolutely correct in that much more attention has to be paid to the Enlightenment in searching for answers to the questions that seem to be pressing in our modern societies, and he thus puts significant effort towards demonstrating how crucial contributions might be unpacked. He also offers provocative new readings of otherwise seemingly familiar thinkers. However, the book appears to be driven more by its telos of reconciling universal human rights and globalization with the political than by impartial and disinterested analysis. One Vladimir Nabokov was a chess composer; usually a person who engages in such an activity transforms the ordinary rivalry between White and Black into competition between composer and solver, and the latter is not really expected to lose. 1 The main principle of chess composition lies in the economy of potency, i.e.
in the distribution of chess pieces across the chessboard in accordance with the needs of the problem itself; it involves a construction of potentiality through obstacles and restrictions, and the chessboard is the initial limitation. In other words, the chess composer deals with the elimination of surplus so that the problem itself would be appear as something more than a game situation, but rather as a phenomena with its own conventions and principles.
Among other things, Nabokov was also a very complicated interviewee: he always self-conducted his interviews. He was particularly persistent about receiving the questions beforehand, so that he could answer them prior to the actual interview. This type of operation produces a strange relationship between question and answer: there is no dialogue, really, but, for some reason, the illusion of one is still important. And so Nabokov would proceed in ways such as this:
INTERVIEWER: Good morning. Let me ask forty-odd questions. In other words, while the (capitalist) economy operates in the medium of money, politics functions in the medium of language. Consequently, humans that are living under the conditions of a capitalist economy are doomed to remain mute:
economic processes cannot be expressed in words, they are "anonymous". In contrast, communism is a fundamental transcription of society to the medium of language: for in capitalism every statement functions as ideologically free, i.e. as a commodity. The possibility of critique requires action from the position of communism, where, in contrast, "every commodity became an ideologically relevant statement." 5 This point is crucial for Groys, because it means that it is possible to confront every commodity produced by the communist system (e.g.
Soviet Union) with ideological critique, just as it is possible to criticize the official doctrines of historical materialism. In short, "everything that is decided in language can be criticized linguistically as well." 6 Groys speaks of politics that, in its essence, elevates and highlights social divisions and contradictions. He goes on to recall Plato, who defines a philosopher as someone who conceives of society as a whole. In contrast, the sophist is someone who hides and conceals the inner contradictions of language, disguising
the paradoxes in what appears to be contradiction-free speech: "[t]he impression of an absence of contradiction can be conveyed only by the rhetorical surfaces of speech." 7 The logical conclusion is that, in a democratic (and, therefore, communist) regime where the main medium of the society is language, there are no "coherent" or "true" (as well as "incoherent" or "untrue") opinions and statements, because "it would undermine the equal opportunities of opinions" to become competitive in the marketplace of ideas. This is why it possible to think of the Soviet Union as a state "governed by philosophy alone" 8
